I. Introduction
Public assistance programs in the United States continue to be the focus of much controversy and concern. Stereotypical views of welfare recipients claim that they do everything possible, from refusing to work to even having additional children, in order to continue receiving assistance. Yet, existing research suggests a substantial number of those eligible for public assistance do not receive it.
This paper examines the dynamics of program eligibility for single mothers and their children, comparing spells of eligibility to spells of participation in the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and Food Stamp programs. This is the first research to model and empirically investigate take-up behavior in a dynamic context, which allows us to investigate the timing of program participation decisions, to assess whether people who participate in these programs are those with the greatest long-term needs, and to look at the interactions between program structure and individual behavior. The availability of repeated longitudinal observations on eligibility and/or participation may also provide more reliable information on take-up behavior than is available in cross-sectional data.
We start by developing a dynamic model of how participation decisions are made among eligible persons, which is the basis for the empirical work that follows. The empirical work focuses on three issues: (1) What are the differences between eligible participants and nonparticipants and how (if at all) do spells of eligibility differ from spells of actual participation? In particular, are nonparticipating eligibles more or less needy than eligible participants? (2) Do public assistance participation spells start concurrently with the opening of an eligibility spell or do newly eligible women try to make it on their own for a while before applying for assistance? and (3) Do public assistance participation spells end concurrently with the end of an eligibility spell or do some fraction of participants leave voluntarily while they are still eligible? The last section discusses the policy implications of the findings.
We summarize the results of this research here rather than at the end of the paper. Overall, we estimate that single mothers use AFDC in 62 to 70 percent of the months in which they are eligible, with slightly lower take-up rates in the Food Stamp program. Much of this participation occurs during long spells of eligibility. There appear to be a large number of relatively short eligibility spells for both AFDC and Food Stamps that open and close without program participation. In fact, only 28 percent of AFDC eligibility spells (24 percent of Food Stamp eligibility spells) that start in our data ever result in AFDC (Food Stamp) receipt. Women who are eligible for but do not participate in these programs tend to be older, white, and nondisabled, with fewer children and more education. This suggests that the program is utilized by those with the greatest long-term need, whose alternative earning opportunities are limited.
Most women who take up public assistance do so within a few months of becoming eligible. For instance, 71 percent of AFDC participation spells start at the beginning of an eligibility spell. Women who become eligible for public assistance and do not start receiving it almost immediately are much more likely to leave eligibility than to enter the program. This suggests two groups of women among the eligibles: A relatively disadvantaged group with low future income expectations who enroll in public assistance immediately, and another less disadvantaged group who (largely correctly) predict future income increases and who do not seek benefits.
A substantial proportion of those leaving assistance programs appear to remain eligible to participate, but apparently choose not to do so. For instance, 50 percent of those leaving AFDC are still eligible at the time of their exit and 30 percent are still eligible 12 months later.
This last finding partly reflects unreported income sources. Little discussed in most take-up-rate studies is the possibility of income underreporting, which would lead to overestimates of potential eligibility and underestimates of take-up rates. We acknowledge this may be a problem in our data, and its possible effects are discussed at several points. The results in this paper should be less subject to such problems than many existing studies, however. We use SIPP data (described below), which have the most complete reports of income currently available in government data. In addition, with longitudinal data we can estimate spells of recipiency and eligibility that are based on repeated income reports. For this reason, the spells of eligibility among nonparticipants that open and close within a few months may be less reliable than those that last longer.
Existing Literature
A growing literature has used longitudinal data to study time patterns of AFDC usage. This literature ranges from tabulations of AFDC participation patterns to estimation of complex time-dependent duration models. ' The results indicate that young women with less education and more children tend to have longer welfare spells. Both the work of Blank (1989) and Fitzgerald (1991) indicate that longer AFDC spells among black women are due to their lower propensity to end welfare through marriage, while there are few racial differences in the propensity to leave welfare through other means. Higher unemployment rates and higher AFDC benefits also lead to longer welfare spells, indicating that the economic and institutional environment affects welfare usage. This work on AFDC has substantially increased our knowledge about the dynamics of AFDC usage, but there is little equivalent research on other public assistance p r~g r a m s .~ In contrast, much less research has focused on eligibility rather than participation, and no one has looked at spells of eligibility. Existing work on take-up rates among eligible participants has been entirely based on point-in-time and typically annual estimates of eligibilit~.~ Using successive cross-sections from the Current Population Survey (CPS), Ruggles and Michel (1987) and Giannarelli and Clark 1. Bane and Ellwood (1983) , Ellwood (1986), and O'Neill et al. (1987) use annual data to look at welfare spells. Blank (1989) , Giannarelli (1992) , Fitzgerald (1991 Fitzgerald ( , 1992 , Ruggles (1989) , Doyle and Long (1988) , and Gritz and MaCurdy (1992) look at monthly data on AFDC use. 2. Blank and Ruggles (1992) estimate duration models for a variety of public assistance programs. 3. We will use the terms "participation rate" and "take-up rate" synonymously in this paper. Both refer to the share of eligible households who actually participate in the program.
(1992) estimate annual AFDC take-up rates between 1967 and 1990, while Trippe et al. (1992) make similar estimates for the Food Stamp program between 1976 and 1990. This work indicates that AFDC participation rates were around 75 percent in the mid-1980s, while Food Stamp take-up rates were near 50 percent.
While these estimates provide a consistent measure of the trends in take-up rates over time, the CPS data are inadequate for calculating accurate take-up rates. Eligibility must be imputed from annual income information (actual eligibility is determined monthly), and the CPS has no information on asset holdings, one of the major determinants of AFDC and Food Stamp eligibilitye4 The CPS also undercounts program participants. With the availability of monthly data through the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), analysts have calculated take-up rates from a single month for both AFDC and Food Stamps, using SIPP's more accurate income figures as well as its asset inf~rmation.~ In contrast to this earlier work, this paper is the first research to use the longitudinal nature of the SIPP data to investigate spells of eligibility versus participation within the AFDC and Food Stamp programs. Moffitt (1983) and others have described an individual's decision to participate or not in AFDC as a single point-in-time comparison between the relative benefits and costs of parti~ipation.~ As we will see below, a number of AFDC participation spells start after the eligibility spell starts or close before the eligibility spell closes. To explain these patterns, we need a more complex time-dependent model.
Modeling Dynamic Participation Decisions
A dynamic model of program participation can be written as
where the function f(:) is scaled so that PT = 0 at the point where the individual is exactly indifferent between participation and nonparticipation. P: > 0 implies participation and P: 5 0 implies nonparticipation at time t . In this model, participation is a function of both a current (time-dependent) benefitlcost comparison, as well as a set of expectations about future income. The first term in (la) is the individual's benefitlcost comparison at time t , measured in terms of the utility functions U(Yt,.). Saving or borrowing may occur 4. Ruggles and Michel (1987) and Giannarelli and Clark (1992) use the TRIM microsimulation model to impute assets based on reported asset income. 5. See Ruggles, Lamas, and Eargle (1992) , Doyle (1992a, 1992b) , and Ross (1988) . These papers estimate the number of eligibles from the SIPP and compare this to the number of program recipients, based on administrative data. It is not obvious that this provides a consistent estimate of take-up rates. 6 . For convenience, this section refers to AFDC participation decisions. The analysis can be readily applied to other public assistance programs.
across periods, so Y,,. represents current consumption rather than current income. Y,,. can be defined as where L,,, and L,,, are the net labor market income of the family when participating or not participating at time t (with the costs of work netted out), 3,is the level of public assistance benefits available to the family at time t, and Yoth,,.is all other family income.' AA,,,-, represents the change in assets between the two periods. This allows women to borrow or to draw down assets for some period of time rather than going on welfare.
C i s the cost of participation, measured in the same units as the utility function. C is a function of two time-dependent components. M , represents a vector of variables that describe the direct costs of participation in terms of the money and time required to apply for and remain eligible for the program. Assume that the one-time direct costs of entering the program may vary from the ongoing costs of participation:
The function g' estimates the direct time and money costs of gathering information and going through the application process for public assistance. In most cases this requires at least one day at the public assistance office, and women often have to come back several times. These costs are a function of four variables. C H Iis a vector representing the number, ages, and child care needs of the children in the family. LOCI is a vector characterizing the geographic isolation of the family, including how far they are from the public assistance office and the availability and cost of public or private transportation. OFC, is a vector of variables describing operating procedures at the local public assistance office, including the availability and efficiency of the staff. APP is a vector characterizing the application process used by the office. Ongoing costs are incurred as eligibility must be regularly recertified, and are characterized by the function g. Monthly reporting to an assigned caseworker about last month's income and family composition is mandatory among AFDC recipients with earned income or a recent work history. Most others must report every six months to their caseworker, although this may vary by state and by ~f f i c e .~
In general, ongoing costs should be lower than initial certification costs.
The second component of the cost function, S,, represents what has come to be called "stigma" costs and indicates the distaste that an individual might feel about participating in public assistance. Stigma costs can be characterized by a simple updating model: (le) S , = S , -l + h(OFCt-,,St-l-S,-l), where h ( . ) is a function by which a woman's distaste for welfare is "updated" each month. Initial distaste for welfare, So, is assumed to be determined by a woman's family background. OFC,_ is the same vector of office-specific factors as in (Id). The more hassles a woman faces in the public assistance office, the greater is her distaste for welfare. The second term, st-,-S t -,: is the difference between the average distaste for welfare among one's friends (S,) and oneself in the previous period. If this difference is negative, own stigma will fall over time, consistent with the effect of role models on individual behavior or the possibility of "neighborhood effects."
The second term in (la) represents future expectations about consumption streams exclusive of benefit participation, where the 6s are the current utility weights associated with future con~umption.~ In particular, the higher the expected consumption without public assistance in the next period, the less likely an individual will choose to participate this period. If a woman expects her eligibility spell to end soon because of expected changes in her income stream-perhaps she expects to find a new job-she is less likely to incur the costs of applying for public assistance.
Equations (la) through (le) describe a model of participation choices over time. This model suggests that women with lower benefits, greater future income and earnings expectations, more assets, and higher cost factors are less likely to participate at any point in time. As these factors change, participation decisions may change over time. In addition, the model predicts that women who enter public assistance this period will be more likely to participate next period than those who have not entered, since participants have already expended the higher one-time application cost. In the empirical work below, we will not be able to estimate a structural form for this model because we lack data on many of the variables such as household location relative to the nearest public assistance office, procedures in the local public assistance office, and information on friends' views of welfare receipt. We will be able to estimate a reduced-form version of this model, however, and will discuss the potential effects of omitted variables below.
IV. Data
The data used in this paper come from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), a longitudinal data set collected on a random sample of the U.S. population. We use the 1986 and 1987 panel files of the SIPP, each of which contain four rotation groups that span the period from October of 1985 through April of 1989. All of the rotation groups provide information for 28 consecutive months, except the first rotation group in 1986, which provides only 9. Given the need for current consumption to remain at some minimal level (particularly with children), it is possible that 6 may become zero quite quickly, so that expectations about income availability more than three or four months in the future may not affect current AFDC participation behavior. 24 months of data. Each wave of the survey was collected every four months, so each participant was interviewed three times a year about his or her monthly experiences over the past four months, including questions about monthly changes in household composition, work behavior, and income.
The SIPP data are particularly useful for our purposes not only because they have longitudinal information on family income sources, but also because they were explicitly designed to collect better income information, especially on public assistance income categories. In comparison to the CPS's annual survey of household income, SIPP reports about the same amount of income from earnings, but about 12 percent more income from transfers. This should make take-up estimates from the SIPP data more accurate, although compared to administrative AFDC data there is still some ~nderreporting.'~ The data set for this paper consists of all spells of single motherhood among women in the SIPP, where a single mother is defined as a currently unmarried woman caring for children aged 18 or younger. She may live alone or with other relatives, forming a subfamily. A woman who is a single parent throughout the SIPP panel has all of her observed months included in our data set. A single mother who marries in the middle of the panel is included only for the months during which she was a single parent. Our data include 3,507 spells (56,657 months) of single motherhood, involving 3,201 persons. Within these spells of single motherhood, we calculate spells of continuous AFDC and Food Stamp usage, as well as spells of AFDC and Food Stamp eligibility."
V. Calculating Program Eligibility
By law, program eligibility is determined on the basis of three items for AFDC and two items for Food Stamps. For AFDC, eligibility depends first upon being the parent of a minor child. Everyone in our sample passes this eligibility screen. Second, AFDC eligibility depends on a cash income calculation. The formulas and maximum grant amounts vary from state to state for different sized families. By federal law, as a woman's earnings increase, she gets to keep $30 in earnings each month. All earnings above $30 are offset against benefits. The federal government sets a benefit reduction rate of 67 percent on earnings in the first four months of work and 100 percent in all months thereafter. For simplicity, we apply a 67 percent tax rate on all earnings over $30.12 We also allow 10. For instance, reported AFDC benefits in SIPP account for 76 to 86 percent of benefits paid by the program, while reported benefits in the CPS account for about 63 percent of benefits paid. See Jabine (19901, chapter 10. 11. We excluded those spells of single motherhood that lasted only one month or where state of residence was unidentified. We deflate all dollars using the monthly consumer price index (CPI), leaving variables in constant $1989. 12. Our results are not sensitive to this assumption. The majority of (reported) work by AFDC women occurs in the first four months of the program. Estimates of effective AFDC tax rates are well below 100 percent, even for long-term work spells (Abe 1993). for federally mandated work expense and child care deductions.13 Third, AFDC eligibility is determined by an asset test. A woman must have less than $1,000 in assets (excluding the value of a home). If she owns a car, its equity value (resale value less any remaining debt) must be below $1,500.
In contrast to AFDC, the Food Stamp program has no household composition test, but it does have a cash income test and an asset test. To be eligible for Food Stamps, a family's earnings and other income are compared to a national formula of benefits and standard deductions. The asset test in the Food Stamp program requires that Food Stamp households have less than $2,000 in wealth holdings ($1,500 in the early part of the sample) and that the resale value of the household car must be less than $4,500.
In addition to monthly income information, special topical modules asked questions about a family's wealth and asset holdings in Wave 4 and Wave 7 of both the 1986 and 1987 SIPP panel. While the information from the two topical modules is not identical,14 both can be used to estimate whether families pass the "asset test" for Food Stamp and AFDC eligibility. We use information from the Wave-4 module to estimate asset eligibility for months that are part of Waves 1 through 5, and information from the Wave-7 module to estimate eligibility for months from Waves 6 and 7. We also calculate whether a woman passes the car asset test, although we are hesitant about the value of these calculations. The accuracy of the car information is not good, it is not available in precisely the right form in all waves, and both programs exempt cars in certain circumstances.
We calculate eligibility under three different definitions for both AFDC and Food Stamps, as shown in Table 1 . Definition 1 estimates eligibility based only on current cash income. Definition 2 estimates eligibility based on current cash income and the asset test on total wealth.15 Definition 3 also includes the car asset test in its eligibility calculations. Table 1 provides information on the extent to which our three eligibility calculations mesh with reported AFDC and Food Stamp receipt. Part A looks at AFDC eligibility. Row 1 indicates that in 57 percent of the months we report no eligibility using definition 1 while the woman reports no AFDC receipt. Row 2 shows the share of months where we impute no eligibility, but the woman reports AFDC receipt. These "errors" are relatively rare, and are due both to underreporting of program use and income by survey respondents as well as to errors in our eligibility calculations. Row 3 reports the share of months where we impute eligi-13. To calculate eligibility, all workers are allowed the federal monthly work expense deduction of $75 and all workers with preschoolers are allowed the federal child care deduction of $16Oichild/month (unless these deductions exceed earnings). Our results are not sensitive to these calculations. 14. The Wave-4 topical module is designed to provide a more comprehensive measure of wealth and asset holdings; the Wave-7 topical module measures only assets which are used to determine eligibility for major transfer programs. 15. We assume that assets held by subfamilies are zero for AFDC eligibility purposes. The 1986 SIPP collects asset information for the entire household, while AFDC eligibility is based only on assets held by the eligible subfamily. (Food Stamp eligibility is based on the entire household.) Tabulations by Eurique Lamas at the Census Bureau with the 1987 SIPP indicate that household assets are rarely held within subfamilies.
bility, but the woman reports no AFDC receipt. This is our primary count of those who choose not to participate in the program, although this too may reflect underreporting problems. Row 4 shows the share of months where we report eligibility and the woman reports receipt. Rows 5 and 6 calculate two alternative take-up rates, including and excluding the count in row 2. These take-up rates are similar since row 2 is small.I6
As the definition of eligibility becomes successively more stringent, the share of eligibles drops and the take-up rate rises. In the absence of other information, it is hard to tell whether the use of the SIPP wealth data provides a better measure of overall eligibility. The share of errors in row 2 rises, but the measure of eligibility and ineligibility in rows 1 and 3 change also and should improve if the wealth information is accurate. Our estimated AFDC take-up rates range from 62 percent to 70 percent.17
Food Stamp eligibility calculations are shown in the bottom of Table 1 . We estimate more families are eligible for Food Stamps than for AFDC, which is expected since the cash income and the asset tests are less stringent. Our eligibility estimates imply that the take-up rate for Food Stamps is lower than for AFDC, similar to prior research. We estimate Food Stamp take-up rates that range from 54 to 66 percent of all eligibles. This is consistent with Ross's (1988) estimates of single-month take-up rates in the SIPP.
As a further test of the accuracy of our eligibility estimates, the last two columns of Table 1 compare the simulated dollars of AFDC and Food Stamps which we estimate persons should receive with the actual amount they report receiving. For both programs, simulated and reported benefits are extremely close among recipients, suggesting that our benefit eligibility calculations are quite accurate. Consistent with our model, eligible nonrecipients have lower expected benefits than do eligible recipients.
For the remainder of this paper, we will use definition 2 to estimate AFDC and Food Stamp eligibility.I8 We avoid using definition 3 because we are unsure about the data used for the car asset test, particularly for AFDC, where we have to estimate equity value. We count someone as eligible for every month in which we impute eligibility, using definition 2, andlor for every month in which she reports participating in the program. We count someone as a participant for every month in which she reports receiving benefits.
One question raised by the take-up numbers in Table 1 is whether the nonparticipants in AFDC are also nonparticipants in Food Stamps. Among all months 16. If you think row 2 mostly reflects underreporting problems, row 6 is the preferred take-up rate. If you think row 2 mostly reflects problems in imputing eligibility, row 5 is the preferred take-up rate. 17. These are consistent with estimates by Ruggles, Lamas, and Eargle (1992) , who calculate singlemonth take-up rates from the SIPP. Our overall error rate is slightly lower than theirs. 18. Over time, earnings, other income, and family composition may all be endogenously chosen to assure benefit eligibility. This is an inherent problem with all take-up-rate estimates, and the extent to which it occurs is unknown. Substantial nonparticipation among eligibles suggests that at least a good fraction of eligibles are not choosing their economic status to assure access to benefits. Major changes in policy could well change the extent of endogenous selection into eligibility, however. Over the years of our sample, there were only minor changes in the AFDC program, which suggests that this effect is at least not varying through our sample. where women are eligible for both AFDC and Food stamp^,'^ in 54 percent of the cases the family participates in both programs. In 7 percent of the months, the woman is on Food Stamps and not on AFDC; in 1 1 percent of the months she is on AFDC and not on Food Stamps; and in 28 percent of the months she participates in neither program. This means that in all eligible months when women do not participate in AFDC, 80 percent of the time they also do not participate in Food Stamps; thus nonparticipation in the two programs is highly linked, as our cost-benefit model would predict.'"
VI. Eligibility and Participation Spells for AFDC and Food Stamps A. Spell Patterns
The top of Table 2 provides information on AFDC spells of eligibility and participation. There are substantially fewer spells of receipt than eligibility (1,224 versus 2,375) and on average they are longer. A higher share of AFDC participation spells are left-censored (62 percent versus 50 percent), and more of the non-leftcensored spells are right-censored. The mean length of non-left-censored participation spells is 8.1 months, more than three months longer than the mean length of non-left-censored eligibility spells. Spells of eligibility and participation that are both non-left-censored and non-right-censored (that is, completed spells observed in the data) are not tabulated separately in Table 2 , but among these completed spells, fully 78 percent of the eligibility spells end within four months, while only 57 percent of the participation spells end within four months." Information on the characteristics of persons in spells of AFDC eligibility and participation are in Appendix Table 1 . AFDC recipients are more likely to be black, never married, disabled, have less education, and to have younger children and more children than are eligible nonrecipients. They are also far less likely to be working-only 16 percent work compared to 54 percent of eligible nonrecipients-and more likely to receive Food Stamps and housing assistance. This suggests that among the population eligible for AFDC, the nonparticipants are the least needy.
The bottom of Table 2 shows Food Stamp eligibility and participation spell data. There are 2,787 spells of Food Stamp eligibility in our data, compared to 1,340 spells of Food Stamp receipt. As with AFDC, Food Stamp eligibility spells are generally shorter than Food Stamp receipt spells. Among the 1,428 non-left-19. This is essentially all months of AFDC eligibility; all AFDC eligibles are also Food Stamp eligibles but the opposite is not true. 20. Fraker and Moffitt (1988) also present information on Food StampIAFDC overlap using different data and a broader definition of eligibility. 21. It is unclear whether we should include the one-month spells of eligibility in the data or not. On the one hand, it is almost impossible to receive public assistance within one month. On the other hand, these may be the beginnings of spells that could have lasted longer. We have duplicated all of the tables in this paper omitting one-month spells; these are available upon request. In no case would our concluslons change. censored eligibility spells, 36 percent are right-censored. This is a substantially lower share of right-censored spells than is observed among Food Stamp participation spells, indicating the shorter average length of eligibility spells. The comparative characteristics of persons in Food Stamp eligibility and participation spells are quite similar to AFDC (see Appendix Table 1 ). Those who are eligible for Food Stamps but never receive them during their eligibility spell are far less disadvantaged than those who receive Food Stamps. They are older, more likely to have been married, less likely to be black, and have fewer children and more education. Many more of them are working, and they are much less likely to receive other forms of public assistance.
B . Estimating the Determinants of Eligibility and Participation Spells
The tabulations of eligibility and participation spells just discussed suggest that there are a large number of relatively short eligibility spells experienced by less disadvantaged women that do not become participation spells. We want to confirm this effect by estimating duration models of the determinants of spell length for eligibility and participation spells.
Econometric Procedure
Using the data presented in Table 2 for AFDC and Food Stamp eligibility and participation spells we can estimate the determinants of the length of these spells. The empirical techniques used are those commonly employed throughout the research literature in estimating the determinants of duration and will not be described here.22 Like most analysts, we eliminate left-censored spells because we do not know how far into the spell a person is when she is first observed, so total spell length cannot be estimated. Thus, we estimate duration models only on those spells that are observed to start within the data.23 Most of the control variables will vary with each month in the spell (so-called "time-varying covariates"); a few, such as race or age at start of spell, are fixed over the spell.
We ignore the fact that in some cases we have multiple spells for the same person.24 Specifications which controlled for observed spell number were tried but this variable was not significant in any of the models. Since we do not have complete histories on these women, it is likely that many of our observed "first 22. For a good reference, see Lancaster (1990) . 23. Qur collection of non-left-censored spells is not a random sample. In particular, it disproportionately excludes very long spells (such as those that are both left-and right-censored in our data). There is no good way to deal with this problem. Even if we approximate the length of left-censored participation spells using administrative data on expected duration, there is no way to do this with eligibility spells. Because virtually all of the very long spells of eligibility are also long spells of participation, excluding these spells may not affect the comparative difference between duration estimates of eligibility and participation spells; the variation in the data between these two groups of spells is all centered in the very short eligibility spells that never become participation spells. 24. Forty-eight percent of the AFDC eligibility spells and 24 percent of AFDC participation spells are multiple spells. Food Stamp numbers are similar. spells" are actually second or higher spells; thus we have no real reason to separate spells by observed spell number. Consistent with our model, we want to control for current and future earnings opportunities, which we do with a set of variables that reflect human capital and family composition characteristics. These include race, age, whether a woman has ever married, years of education, total number of children, number of children under age 6, income available outside of earnings and public assistance, and whether a woman reports a work disability.
We also control for seven other locational and program-related variables. We use unemployment rates by state and by month to control for local labor market condition^.^' We include state AFDC benefit maximums for an equivalently sized family to control for differences in the generosity of welfare benefits across states.26 In addition, states that provide more generous AFDC benefits are typically more generous on other dimensions of public assistance as well, so this variable may act as a proxy for the willingness of the state to provide public a s~i s t a n c e .~We also collected information on the number of public assistance offices in a state and include a measure of number of offices per person. A higher rate of offices per person in the state should increase the locational convenience of offices and may also proxy the extent to which the state makes public assistance easier to acquire. We would ideally also like to control for locational characteristics. Unfortunately, SIPP provides only state identifiers, with no information on what type of community a family is located in.28 To proxy locational issues, we include the share of the state population that resides in nonmetropolitan areas, and we include three dummy variables controlling for Census region location. We also expect that the never-married variable will be correlated with urban location.
A major question in duration analysis involves the empirical specification of the hazard rate. Controlling for all other included variables, the hazard rate estimates the remaining time-dependent pattern in the data. The preferred method is to use a semi-parametric specification that includes a separate dummy variable for each month in a spell. While we can do this in our data, such monthly time parameters are not very meaningful because of the seam bias problem in the SIPP data, where changes are unduly likely to be reported as occurring between the end of one four-month interview period and the beginning of the next. In order to deal with this problem, we estimate a set of time parameters for each fourmonth period, and also include a variable that equals 1 in the last month of 25. Monthly state unemployment rates were collected from various volumes of Employment and Eartzings, published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 26. These change over time as state benefit changes are enacted. We tried to ascertain the month in which changes were implemented; otherwise, we assumed benefit changes coincided with the calendar year. 27. Unfortunately, no consistent state data are available on either disqualification rates or acceptance rates for AFDC or Food Stamp applicants. Quarterly Public Assistance Statistics reports applications rejected per state, but the definition of "rejection" varies across states. 28. This is due to confidentiality requirements. Fitzgerald (1992) uses specially provided data that links county-level data with the SIPP to investigate the effect of county characteristics on AFDC duration. He finds that the only consistently important variable is urban location. each SIPP interview period. Thus, we have four-month rather than monthly time parameter^.^^
Competing Risk Estimates of AFDC and Food Stamp Eligibility and Participation Spells
We use a competing risk estimation procedure which assumes that a spell is simultaneously at risk of ending in one of two ways. A spell can end either by changes in family composition (primarily through marriage, although in a few cases children leave the household) or it can end in other ways, most commonly through earnings or other income increases that end e l i g i b i l i t~.~~ The competing risk model assumes that these two types of spell endings are differently determined and estimates a separate set of coefficients and time parameters for each type of exit. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3 present our estimates from a competing risk model of the duration of AFDC eligibility spells, while Columns 3 and 4 present similar estimates for the duration of AFDC participation spells. The coefficients in Table  3 indicate the effect of a given variable on the probability of a spell ending in the specified way. Thus, the significant positive coefficient on age in Column 1 of Table 3 indicates that older women are more likely to experience an income change that ends their AFDC eligibility spell, while the negative coefficient on age in Column 2 indicates that older women are less likely to end an AFDC eligibility spell through family composition changes.
Our results for AFDC participation spells are very similar to those found elsewhere in the literature and confirm many of the results that we have already discussed above. They can be summarized briefly in three points.
First, there are a large number of short AFDC eligibility spells among relatively more advantaged women (older, more educated, nondisabled, white, with fewer children) that end quickly through an income increase. The characteristics that affect the ending of eligibility spells are exactly those characteristics most likely to be associated with greater current and future earnings opportunities. The hazard rates from the duration estimates for eligibility spells indicate the high probability that eligibility spells will end quickly. In the first four months, the probability that an AFDC eligibility spell will end via an income change is 15 percent per month; this drops steadily to around 2 percent after 16 months.
Second, the probability that a participation spell of AFDC will end through an income increase is much lower and less determined by personal characteristics; these spells last longer and their hazard rates change less over time. For instance, the hazard rate from the estimates in Table 3 indicates that the probability that an AFDC participation spell will end through an income change is only around 4 29. Because of the decreasing number of longer non-left-censored spells, we group higher-order spells together. Thus, when Table 3 indicates we included five four-month time parameters, this means four four-month dummy variables, with a final variable for all spells of 17 months or longer. 30. We will refer to these endings as "income changes" although, as discussed later, at times no discernable changes in income have occurred. We tabulate family composition changes first; all spell endings that are not associated with changes in family composition are put in the other category. percent in the first few months, dropping to 1 percent after 16 months. Greater education and higher levels of nonearned income are the only significant characteristics associated with income increases that lead to the end of an AFDC participation spell. Lower AFDC benefit levels are strongly correlated with shorter participation spells. This reflects the fact that greater income changes are necessary to leave AFDC in higher-benefit states; whether there are additional effects of benefit levels on behavior cannot be deduced from these estimates.
Third, the probability of ending either an eligibility or a participation spell through changes in family composition is similarly determined by those variables that make marriage more likely. Women who are more likely to experience a change in family composition are white, younger, have been married in the past, have fewer children, and are not disabled. The hazard rate for family composition changes is relatively flat over time, indicating a 2 to 4 percent chance each month that an eligibility or a participation spell will end due to changes in family composition3'
VII. The Start of an Eligibility Spell versus the Start of a Participation Spell

A. Patterns in Participation after the Opening of an Eligibility Spell
One question of particular interest in comparing eligibility to participation in public assistance programs is the extent to which participation and eligibility begin concurrently. Our model suggests that women who receive public assistance may not do so immediately upon becoming eligible, because there are start-up costs to enrolling in the program, because they may be uncertain about the length of their eligibility spell, and because they may be able to maintain consumption levels without public assistance in the short term. Part A of Table 4 investigates the sequential use of AFDC after an AFDC eligibility spell begins. Column 1 shows the number of ongoing AFDC eligibility spells at each month from the beginning of the spell, where there has been no previous AFDC receipt. Column 2 shows the share of these spells in which AFDC receipt begins in that month. Column 3 shows the share of spells that are rightcensored at the end of that month because the data end. Column 4 shows the share of these spells that close at the end of that month. Thus, row 1 indicates that there are 1,175 non-left-censored eligibility spells, whose beginnings are observed in the data. Among these spells, 20 percent begin AFDC receipt immediately in this first month, 4 percent are right-censored after one month, and 23 percent close without AFDC receipt after one month. The total number of ongoing eligibility spells without AFDC receipt in month 2 is identically equal to the number of eligibility spells in month 1 minus those that enter AFDC, those that are censored, and those where eligibility ends after one month. Table 4 indicates that 20 percent of AFDC eligibility spells start with a concurrent spell of AFDC receipt in the first month. This implies that four-fifths of the women who are eligible for AFDC do not immediately take it up. Most strikingly, as the last row in part A of Table 4 indicates, only 28 percent of those women who experience an eligibility spell will ever take up AFDC. This is much lower than the overall take-up rate of 68 percent indicated in Table 1 . This is because Table 1 calculated the share of months of eligibility where AFDC was received. Table 4 calculates the share of spells of AFDC eligibility where AFDC is ever received. Once women start receiving AFDC, they may receive it for many months; thus the majority of months of eligibility are also take-up months. But the majority of spells of AFDC eligibility close or are censored before take-up occurs.32 Most of these eligibility spells without take-up are very short spells. Twenty-three percent of them close within one month, another 21 percent of the remaining spells close within two months, etc. This implies that there are a lot of women "at risk" for AFDC for a short period of time who never make use of it.
Among those persons who do take up AFDC, there is little evidence that women migrate onto AFDC over time. Seventy-one percent start immediately when eligibility begins (19.7 divided by 27.8).33 The remainder start very soon after the beginning of the eligibility spell. Six months after an eligibility spell begins, virtually all of the women who will ultimately take up AFDC during their spell have begun receipt.
Part B of Table 4 reports identical calculations for Food Stamp eligibility spells among single-mother families. The patterns here are very similar to those in AFDC. Among all Food Stamp eligibility spells observed to start in the data, only 24 percent ultimately result in Food Stamp receipt, much less than the take-up rate in Table 1 , which indicates that Food Stamp receipt occurs in 63 percent of the eligible months. Of these, 73 percent (17.5 divided by 24.0) begin their Food Stamp spell in the same month that the eligibility spell begins. Within six months after eligibility opens, almost all women who are going to take up the program have already begun to do so.
Over half, 54 percent, of Food Stamp eligibility spells for these single-mother families are observed to close without Food Stamp take-up. Many of these are short spells; 20 percent of eligibility spells close within one month, while another 22 percent of the remaining spells close after two months. As with AFDC, there 32. These results are based only on eligibility spells that start in our data and exclude left-censored spells. As discussed above, left-censored spells are more likely to be long spells where benefits are received. This means the data in Tables 4 and 5 are not from a random set of all spells. If we assume that all long-term eligibility spells (both left-and right-censored) include participation, while all leftcensored but not right-censored spells have the same distribution as shown here for the non-left-censored spells, then the take-up rate among AFDC eligibility spells is 42.7 percent, while the take-up rate among Food Stamp eligibility spells is 38.5 percent. 33. The number of receipt and eligibility spells starting in exactly the same month is probably overstated, due to the seam bias problem mentioned above. The conclusion that most participation spells start near the onset of eligibility is unaffected by this problem, however.
are a large number of relatively short Food Stamp eligibility spells that close without Food Stamp receipt.
An alternative interpretation is that these short eligibility spells involve income underreporting and are erroneously labeled. Here the presence of longitudinal data is useful, since we can eliminate spells that do not include two consecutive reports on income and participation. If we assume that all eligibility spells that open and close within four months without receipt (one wave of the SIPP) are mislabeled and discard them, then the spell take-up rate is exactly 50 percent for AFDC and 42.8 percent for Food Stamps, still indicating that many eligibility spells do not end in program receipt. Table 4 has two striking findings. First, most women who receive public assistance begin receipt within a few months of when their eligibility spell starts. There is little evidence of delayed program entry among participants. Second, many eligibility spells open and close without program receipt. This section further investigates these findings by investigating those eligibility spells that open without immediate program receipt. These spells of eligibility-without-receipt are at risk of two endings: They can end through delayed entry onto either AFDC or Food Stamps, or they can end when the eligibility spell is over (without ever resulting in program receipt). The determinants of the length of nonreceipt eligibility spells can be estimated, again using a competing risk model to estimate the determinants of each type of spell ending. The estimates will indicate which characteristics are likely to result in an eligibility spell that closes without program receipt and which lead to delayed program entry. Table 5 presents the competing risk duration estimates in Columns 1 and 2 for AFDC eligibility spells that start without AFDC receipt.34 Column 1 gives the determinants of spell length among AFDC eligibility spells that end without AFDC receipt. Column 2 gives the determinants of spell length among AFDC eligibility spells that end in delayed AFDC receipt. These are clearly two very different sets of coefficient estimates. Women who are older and better educated in low unemployment states are more likely to end a spell of AFDC eligibility without taking up AFDC. Women who are black, disabled, never married, and who live in states with more public assistance offices per person are more likely to end a spell of AFDC eligibility by taking up AFDC. Perversely, women in states with higher AFDC benefit maximums are less likely to end an eligibility spell with AFDC parti~ipation.~' Columns 3 and 4 of Table 5 provide similar estimates for Food Stamp eligibility spells that open without Food Stamp receipt. The results are quite similar to the 34. Note that the conditioning event-an eligibility spell starting without immediate AFDC receipt-is important. Table 4 indicated that 71 percent of AFDC participation spells start in the first month of eligibility. The "spell length" of eligibility in this case is zero; the estimates in Table 5 necessarily omit these observations. 35. We tried including a variable for receipt of Medicaid in Table 5 . Families who have medical problems are much more likely to move onto AFDC, which gives them categorical eligibility for Medicaid. This variable, however, is endogenous and we omit it from the reported specification.
B . Duration Models of Eligibility Spells that Open without AFDC Receipt
AFDC estimates. Nondisabled better-educated women who are older, previously married, have fewer children, and who live in states with low unemployment rates, higher AFDC benefit maximums (again, a perverse effect), and a high rural population share are more likely to end a Food Stamp eligibility spell without ever taking up the program. Women who have a work disability or who are younger are more likely to move from an eligibility spell into Food Stamp receipt.
The hazard rates from the estimates in Table 5 indicate that the probability that an eligibility spell which opens without program receipt will end in delayed program entry is very low and constant over the months. In contrast, the probability that an eligibility spell that opens without program receipt will close without program receipt is between 25 and 30 percent in the early months and remains quite high even after a year of eligibility.
The overall lesson from this section is that the determinants of those eligibility spells which result in delayed program entry are very different from the determinants of eligibility spells that close without program receipt. Women who are less disadvantaged across a range of variables are much more likely to leave an eligibility spell without moving onto the program. This suggests that there are two groups of women among the eligibles. The group that receives public assistance has few resources and starts receiving benefits soon after becoming eligible. A second, somewhat more advantaged group ignores potential eligibility, seemingly predicting with accuracy that they will soon experience an income increase.
VIII. The End of Participation Spells versus the End of Eligibility Spells
Just as it is interesting to look at the sequential patterns of program use when an eligibility spell starts, so it may be particularly interesting to look at the sequential patterns in ongoing eligibility after a participation spell ends. Table 6 investigates whether participation and eligibility spells end concurrently. The first two columns in Table 6 tabulate eligibility in consecutive months following the end of an AFDC participation spell for those spells where data are observed in the month after the spell closes (non-right-censored spells). In over 40 percent of these cases, the women are still eligible for AFDC in the immediate months after they stop participating. While this implies that over half of all AFDC spell endings occur simultaneously with an eligibility spell ending, it does mean that a substantial number of spell endings occur in the face of ongoing eligibility. As a postprogram spell lengthens, the percent of women who are still eligible for AFDC declines, but the number remaining eligible continues at 20 to 30 percent even in postprogram spells that last longer than a year.36
These results imply that many women leave AFDC who could technically stay on the program. To provide further information on these women who leave before their eligibility ends, we calculate their simulated AFDC benefits, before and after ending AFDC participation. Average earnings and income rise for this group of 36. A postprogram spell will end either by a woman returning to AFDC or by the end of the data. women at the time they end participation, producing a fall in expected AFDC benefits from $308 to $268. But $268 seems a surprisingly large benefit for lowincome families to forego. The last two columns of Table 6 present similar evidence for Food Stamp postprogram spells. Of the 451 spell closings where data are observed in the following month, fully 60 percent of these women are still eligible for Food Stamps in their first month after leaving the program. Less than half of Food Stamp spell closures occur simultaneously with an eligibility spell closing. This number declines only slightly over time, from 60 percent eligible one month after leaving Food Stamps, to 55 percent eligible 12 months after leaving Food Stamps. A substantial number of women appear to remain eligible for Food Stamps long after they have left the program. Surprisingly, our simulated benefits indicate that those women who leave Food Stamp participation and are still eligible have higher dollar benefits after terminating participation than before-their expected Food Stamp amounts rise from $134 to $144. This occurs because many of these women simultaneously leave both AFDC and Food Stamps, and the loss of AFDC income is not made up by their increase in earnings and other income; thus their projected Food Stamp benefit rises.
Given these surprisingly high rates of ongoing eligibility following AFDC and Food Stamp spell endings, we investigate this issue further by looking at the reasons for spell endings within our sample. Table 7 tabulates the percent of spell endings which are coterminous with income increases, nonearned income increases, or family composition changes.37 Among all AFDC spells, Table 7 indicates that 25 percent of them end when family composition changes (primarily women who get married). 42 percent end when own earnings increase and 12 percent end when nonearned income increases. In 21 percent of the cases, however, none of these factors seem to occur.
Among those who leave AFDC participation and eligibility concurrently, close to 90 percent leave through increases in income or through changes in family composition. In comparison, among those who continue eligibility after a spell ending, 44 percent of the families show none of these three types of changes. This suggests that there may be unreported changes in earnings or other income occurring in these household^.^^ We suspect these women are voluntarily leaving AFDC when they find they can "get by" with other income sources. While it is possible in some of these cases that the AFDC office has discovered these unreported funds, the most common method by which women leave the rolls is by failing to show up for their recertification interview, which results in automatic benefit termination.
One way to further explore the nature of these "unexplained" spell endings is 37. We created these variables by first counting the number of spells where eligibility ended due to family composition changes; second, among remaining spells, we count all women with an earnings increase; third, among remaining spells, we count all women with an increase in nonearned income; and fourth, among remaining spells, we count all women with changes in family composition (but no eligibility change) and add them into the first group. 38. For evidence on the extent of unreported income among AFDC recipients, see Jencks and Edin (1990) or Edin (1994) .
to look at recidivism rates. The final column of Table 7 indicates the percent of cases where a woman is observed to return to program participation. AFDC recidivism rates among women with continuing eligibility are almost twice as high (29 percent) as among those whose eligibility ends (15 percent). Among women whose eligibility continues, however, recidivism is actually higher among those with earnings or other income changes than it is among those who show no reason for leaving the program.39 Thus, there is not much evidence that the "none of these" category reflects administrative churning, whereby women are thrown off AFDC for failure to comply with the rules but then reenter the program at a later date. This is consistent with the fact that many women remain eligible for many months following the end of their AFDC spell (Table 6 ). Among Food Stamp spell endings, the same share (24 percent) end through family composition changes, while fewer (35 percent) leave via earnings increases and more (24 percent) leave via increases in nonearned income. The number of endings that show neither earnings, nonearned income, nor family composition changes is smaller; only 30 percent of Food Stamp spells with continuing eligibility are in the "none of these" category. As with AFDC, women with continuing eligibility are more likely to return to Food Stamps.
The tabulations in Table 7 indicate that there is some substantial amount of unexplained movement off AFDC and Food Stamps, with women leaving these programs even when they seem to experience small or no change in their economic situation and have substantial benefit dollars still available to them. In part, this almost surely reflects the underreporting of income and earnings among low-income households. But there is little reason to believe that this income is being more accurately reported to public assistance offices. Some substantial number of participants appear to find opportunities to leave public assistance, even though they may still be able to qualify for some level of benefits. This confirms that program recipients experience costs to participation that they wish to avoid and is not consistent with extensive welfare "dependence" by AFDC and Food Stamp recipient^.^^
IX. Conclusions
Despite the ongoing preoccupation of many public officials with high AFDC and Food Stamp caseloads, these results indicate that a substantial number of those who become eligible for these programs do not actually use them. Many women experience short periods of low income which would qualify them for these programs, but clearly opt not to participate. In addition, despite Note: Changes and ongoing eligibility calculated by comparing the month before the spell ends with the second month after the spell ends. Changes in family composition include persons who marry out of AFDC as well as those whose family size changes. a. Percent of spell endings where the individual is observed to return to AFDC or Food Stamp participation at some later point in the data.
concerns about the need to push women off "dependency" on public assistance, these data also indicate that a surprising number of women leave the program before their measured eligibility terminates. Program usage among eligibles appears to be much more fluid than many stereotypes would indicate. Policy discussions of low take-up rates on public assistance programs often focus on the question of need levels among non-participating families. Some have suggested that many needy women simply do not know about or cannot access these programs. If most nonparticipants are persons with either higher costs or lower benefits, this supports the "choice" model of nonparticipation and suggests we should be less concerned about low take-up rates. The evidence in this paper is generally supportive of that claim. The non-participating eligibles in both programs have lower average expected benefits. Women whose eligibility spells do not result in participation spells are much less disadvantaged across a range of parameters, supporting the idea that current and expected future income plays a key role in participation decisions. The most disadvantaged experience long-term spells of eligibility and these almost always involve long-term benefit receipt. In addition, the group of women who end benefit receipt while they are still eligible are clearly a group for whom it is not lack of knowledge that explains their nonparticipation. All of this supports a choice-based model of participation decisions.
Yet, it is worth noting that many of the eligible nonparticipants appear to be eligible for a substantial amount of program benefits. These women are on average eligible for around $250 in AFDC and $140 in Food Stamps. This suggests that the costs of participation to these women are almost unbelievably large and it underscores the need to better understand the scope of income underreporting among low-income families.
If all eligible women elected to use AFDC or Food Stamps, the costs of these programs would clearly increase. To get some idea of the savings due to nonparticipation, we calculate the ratio of all simulated benefits among program eligibles to all simulated benefits among program recipients in our sample. For AFDC this ratio is 1.33; for Food Stamps it is 1.60. In 1989, a year at the end of our sample, $15.9 billion was paid in total AFDC benefits while $13.8 billion was paid in Food Stamp benefits. If there had been 100 percent participation among single eligible parents in these programs, AFDC benefits would instead have been $21.1 billion and Food Stamp benefits would have been $22.1 billion. Clearly, the nonparticipation of many eligible women in these programs keeps their cost substantially below what it would be if take-up rates were closer to 100 percent.
Better and more detailed data could allow us to actually sort out how much of the nonparticipation that occurs among eligibles is due to the direct time and money costs of participation, how much is due to women's psychological "distaste" for public assistance, and how much these are affected by operating procedures in public assistance offices.
